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ABSTRACT 
 
THE REAL AMBASSADORS:  
A MUSICAL ON JAZZ DIPLOMACY AND RACE RELATIONS DURING  
THE EARLY COLD WAR YEARS 
 
by 
 
Treshani Perera 
 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2017 
Under the Supervision of Professor Gillian Rodger 
 
This Master’s thesis examines jazz diplomacy and race relations in the United States 
during the early Cold War years, the U.S. State Department’s cultural diplomacy propaganda 
initiatives, and narratives of musicians featured in State Department jazz tours as reflected in the 
musical The Real Ambassadors. The musical was written by Iola and Dave Brubeck following their 
State Department jazz tour of Europe, Asia and the Middle East in 1958. The debut performance 
took place at the 1962 Monterey Jazz Festival, featuring Louis Armstrong in the lead role. A 
textural analysis of songs from the musical will be considered for in-depth coverage of musicians’ 
narrative and experience with locals during jazz diplomacy tours. A thorough understanding of 
American cultural and racial history during the early Cold War years is also crucial for 
contextualizing intersections between music and politics in the U.S. during the time period.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Race Relations, Cultural Diplomacy, and Jazz: Setting the Stage 
 
 
U.S. cultural programming during the Cold War represented the country’s largest 
propaganda effort next to foreign policy and diplomacy. The wide spread of jazz throughout the 
world during the early Cold War years helped determine the course of the Cold War and 
redefine American foreign diplomacy in some instances. In this cultural Cold War, the Soviet 
Union lacked a weapon to counter jazz, making it the most successful tool within “the arsenal of 
democracy.”1 The 1950s and 1960s were critical years for U.S. cultural diplomacy to establish its 
supremacy, but the rest of the world seemed focused on the hypocrisy behind the prevailing 
racial inequality in a country boastful of its freedom and democracy. The Soviet Union was 
quick to notice and publicize American politics as segregationist and its culture as “decadent, 
amoral, materialistic, and individualistic.”2 As a bold propaganda move in 1956, the State 
Department strategically began to highlight jazz, African American musicians and integrated 
bands as part of cultural diplomacy. This strategy prompted disapproval from state officials, 
both local and abroad, sometimes condemning jazz as a “crude” art. In a memo to Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles on 23 July 1954, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot 
Lodge, Jr. advised that only “quality music” such as Western classical art music and ballet 
should be represented in the U.S. cultural programs abroad and to “avoid jazz music… at first 
                                                        
1    Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters 
(New York: New Press, 1999), 2. 
2    Lisa Davenport, “The Paradox of Jazz Diplomacy: Race and Culture in the Cold War,” in  
African Americans in U.S. Foreign Policy: From the Era of Frederick Douglass to the Age of 
Obama, edited by Linda Heywood, Allison Blakely, Charles R. Stith, and Joshua C. Yesnowitz 
(Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2015), 142. 
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and later work it in only as a part of a fairly highbrow program.”3 Despite Lodge Jr.’s seemingly-
elitist bias, the Eisenhower administration, recognizing jazz’s propaganda power, charged the 
State Department and the U.S. Information Agency to actively promulgate jazz as part of 
cultural programing.4  
The official platform given to jazz was met with resistance by some members in 
Congress; Representative John Rooney from New York led the attack with strong support from 
Louisiana Senator and Southern segregationist Allen J. Ellender. When Gillespie was chosen and 
announced as the first jazz ambassador to tour for the State Department, Ellender opposed the 
decision by declaring that Gillespie’s music would reduce the American cultural image to 
“barbarians,” but the tour turned out to be one of the most successful official cultural 
presentations.5 Gillespie’s band arrived in Greece and played a matinee show for university 
students shortly after the stoning of the U.S. field office in Athens. These students were 
angered by U.S. support of Greece’s right wing dictatorship, and “the anti-American feeling was 
real and intense.”6 Gillespie described the experience as, “They loved us so much that when we 
finished playing they tossed their jackets into the air and carried me on their shoulders through 
                                                        
3    Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol. 2, United States Department of State, 
1775.  
4 Davenport, “Paradox of Jazz Diplomacy,” 142. More information on U.S. agencies involved in 
cultural diplomacy can be found in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
5    Penny M. Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004), 40; Reinhold Wagnleitner, “Jazz: 
the classical music of globalization,” in Satchmo Meets Amadeus, edited by Reinhold 
Wagnleitner (Innsbruck, Germany: Studienverlag. 2006), 295.  
6 Von Eschen, 34; Dizzy Gillespie quoted in Ralph Ginzburg, “Jazz is too good for Americans,” 
Esquire (June 1957), 55. The field offices were part of the U.S. Information Agency, a 
government agency in Washington. 
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the streets of the city.”7 The local newspapers carried a similar sentiment of success with the 
headlines “Students Drop Rocks and Roll with Dizzy,” prompting field mission officials to 
conclude that jazz was “powerfully effective against Red Propaganda” and for “communicating 
with [locals] regardless of language or social barriers.”8 Jazz scholar Marshall W. Stearns, who 
accompanied Gillespie on tour, aptly captured the success as, 
It has never dawned upon Americans that many people in foreign lands consider 
jazz a new and impressive contribution to culture. Jazz was born and grew up in 
the United States and nowhere else. As a European composer remarked to me: 
“Jazz is one of America's best-loved artistic exports.”9 
 
While jazz musicians were subject to frequent State Department “briefings”, it is important to 
acknowledge that they were by no stooges of U.S. foreign policy. Many jazz musicians – both 
Black and White - openly shared their views on race and domestic policies with locals, to the 
displeasure of government officials. Intentionally or unintentionally, cultural diplomacy tours 
depicted “pronounced differences in the aims of artists and government officials,” sometimes 
leading to a difference in opinion on what to highlight as values in American culture.10     
This thesis examines jazz diplomacy and race relations in the United States during the 
early Cold War years, roughly spanning the 1950s and 1960s. While jazz tours counted towards 
a small percentage of U.S. cultural programming, their successes were in establishing cultural 
relationships with locals, as portrayed in the musical The Real Ambassadors. The musical was 
written by Iola and Dave Brubeck following their State Department jazz tour of Europe, Asia, 
                                                        
7 Von Eschen, 34. 
8 Von Eschen, 34; Music Advisory Panel meeting minutes (24 April 1956, 12 June 1956), Bureau 
of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, University of Arkansas Fayetteville. 
9    Marshall W. Stearns, “Is Jazz Good Propaganda? The Dizzy Gillespie Tour,'' Saturday Review 
(July 14, 1956), 31.  
10 Wagnleitner, “Jazz: the classical music of globalization,” 296. 
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and the Middle East in 1958. The debut performance took place at the 1962 Monterey Jazz 
Festival, featuring Louis Armstrong, another jazz ambassador, playing himself in the lead role. A 
textural analysis of songs from the musical and personal memoirs of Louis Armstrong and the 
Brubecks will present an in-depth understanding of musicians’ experiences, observations, and 
interactions with locals during jazz diplomacy tours. A thorough understanding of U.S. race 
relations and foreign policy during the early Cold War years is also crucial for contextualizing 
intersections between music and politics during this time period.  
 Walter Carrington, in his Preface to African Americans in U.S. Foreign Policy, defines 
diplomacy as “a duty to speak sometimes unpalatable truths not only to people and 
governments to which they are assigned, but also… the expectation that their insights can have 
an important impact on the formation of the policies they are expected to carry out.”11 Jazz 
musicians such as Duke Ellington, Louis Armstrong, Dizzy Gillespie, Dave Brubeck, and others, 
were part of the State Department jazz tours that began in the mid-1950s and lasted through 
the 1960s with the aim of spreading goodwill and democratic values around the world. Jazz was 
portrayed as a unification of freedom and democracy, which later led to the term “Jazzocracy.” 
As Mark Laver explains, Jazzocracy refers to the democratic practice in jazz, where 
improvisation positions the individual in a “dialectical” relationship with the collective.12 The 
music that is produced is the result of a democratic process representing the interests of the 
individual and the collective while celebrating the individual’s freedom of expression.   
                                                        
11    Walter Carrington, Preface to African Americans in U.S. Foreign Policy: From the Era of 
Frederick Douglass to the Age of Obama, edited by Linda Heywood, Allison Blakely, Charles R. 
Stith, and Joshua C. Yesnowitz (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2015), xix. 
12    Mark Laver, “Freedom of Choice: Jazz, Neoliberalism, and the Lincoln Center,” Popular 
Music and Society 37, no. 5 (2014), 538. 
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When State Department jazz tours commenced in 1956, the focal regions were Asia, 
Europe, and the Middle East; eventually Africa and the Soviet Union were added as tour 
locations. Emerging and newly-independent countries in Africa and politically-unstable Middle 
Eastern countries were specifically targeted as these regions had not firmly allied with either 
the United States or the Soviet Union, but were perceived to be threatened by communism.13 
Dave Brubeck described his 1958 tour of Eastern Europe and Asia as “a circle around the Soviet 
Union,” which aligned with the propaganda framework for U.S. cultural and foreign diplomacy: 
to “promote and consolidate American economic and military interests in nations bordering the 
Soviet Union,” and generate goodwill between locals and American citizens through cultural 
exchange.14 The U.S. Information Agency (USIA), in particular, was interested in presenting a 
counter narrative to the Soviet propaganda campaign that was drawing unwanted attention to 
segregation and racial tension in the United States.15 In order to portray a picture of racial 
equality in practice, nearly all jazz bands on tour featured personnel from both races, or 
featured an African American bandleader. Duke Ellington described his encounters with locals 
during his 1963 State Department tour of East and South Asia, especially those who were 
curious about racial equality in the United States, as: “The big question when they meet an 
American Negro is always the race problem, [but] we have all the problems of a free country.”16  
                                                        
13 Ibid., 543. 
14    Stephen Crist, “Jazz as Democracy? Dave Brubeck and Cold War Politics,” The Journal of 
Musicology 26, no.2 (2009), 162; Laver, “Freedom of Choice,” 544. 
15 Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows up the World, 11. 
16 Ellington quoted in Harvey G. Cohen, “Visions of Freedom: Duke Ellington in the Soviet 
Union,” Popular Music 30, no.3 (2011), 306. 
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Lisa Davenport summarizes the outcome of State Department tours as the jazz 
diplomacy paradox, where “racial equality, integration, and American exceptionalism” 
sometimes did not align with the realities of racial bias faced by African American jazz 
musicians.17 As pianist Quincy Jones, who toured with Dizzy Gillespie in Greece in 1956, 
recalled, “It was the state officials who ‘patronizingly’ warned Greek locals to steer clear of the 
Black guys.”18   
In Freedom Sounds: Civil Rights Call Out to Jazz and Africa, ethnomusicologist Ingrid 
Monson argues that jazz and its discourse during the Civil Rights Movement had much in 
common with the politics of the time.19 Monson maps the changing political, social, and musical 
landscape through the perspective of musicians on State Department jazz tours and their 
interactions with locals, the media, and domestic audiences to highlight these parallels. 
Interviews, archival research, and analysis of recordings and performances reveal how Black 
and White performers had starkly different experiences based on race, and how their musical 
aesthetics embodied the tensions of the period.  
 Among scholarship covering jazz diplomacy and cultural exchange during the Cold War 
years, the most comprehensive coverage of government records is found in Fosler-Lussier’s 
Music in American’s Cold War Diplomacy and Nicholas Cull’s The Cold War and the United 
States Information Agency. Both monographs extensively cover the history of U.S. cultural 
diplomacy and agencies and strategies set forth by the State Department and the USIA during 
                                                        
17 Davenport, “The Paradox of Jazz Diplomacy,” 146. 
18 Quincy Jones, Q: The Autobiography of Quincy Jones (New York, Doubleday, 2001), 112-4. 
19 Ingrid Monson, Freedom Sounds: Civil Rights Call Out to Jazz and Africa (Oxford: Oxford  
University Press, 2007). 
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the Cold War. The website accompanying Fosler-Lussier’s Music in America’s Cold War 
Diplomacy presents records from the U.S. Advisory Committee on the Arts (ACA) that 
encouraged the promotion of “art of the highest quality” in cultural programming. Fosler-
Lussier’s scholarship also covers deliberations and arguments made by Music Advisory Panel 
members against and in support of jazz to be represented in U.S. cultural programming.20 Cull’s 
scholarship outlines the history of Cold War broadcasting, U.S. propaganda since the Truman 
administration, and a detailed history of the State Department and its agencies (including name 
changes!) active during the Cold War. 
Lisa Davenport’s dissertation-turned-monograph Jazz Diplomacy: Promoting America in 
the Cold War Era largely focuses on the State Department jazz tours and issues of race 
surrounding jazz diplomacy. Davenport’s recurring argument is that the “cultural oppression” of 
the nation’s African American minority came to symbolize “the cultural superiority of American 
democracy” with the use of jazz in Cultural Presentations.21 Davenport also emphasizes how 
policymakers and State Department officials portrayed jazz as an authentic expression of 
American life and as a powerful arsenal for the U.S. to win the cultural Cold War against the 
Soviet Union.   
Penny Von Eschen’s extensive research on the jazz ambassadors program and artist 
accounts are reflected in her seminal work Satchmo Blows up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play 
the Cold War. The monograph explores how and why the State Department jazz tours were 
                                                        
20 “A Statement on the Selection of American Art to be Sent Abroad under the Government’s 
International Cultural Relations Programs,” Minutes from the Eighth meeting of the Advisory 
Committee on the Arts, 25–26 April 1960, box 159, Record Group 59, National Archives. 
21 Davenport, “The Paradox of Jazz Diplomacy,” 145. 
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successful in disseminating U.S. propaganda through cultural programming. Von Eschen’s 
emphasis lies in the role played by African American jazz musicians and integrated bands to 
counter international criticism of U.S. racial tension and segregation.  
The time period focus of this thesis is approximately from the end of the Second World 
War through the 1960s, in order to convey policy and programming decisions made prior to and 
during the jazz diplomacy tours. This includes the establishment of Cold War broadcasting that 
led to the popularity of American jazz and popular music abroad, important civil rights events 
for African Americans, and jazz diplomacy tours that influenced the writing and debut 
performance of the musical The Real Ambassadors.  
Chapter 2 presents the origins of State Department cultural propaganda and the role 
played by jazz and jazz musicians. Much of this chapter covers the history and origins of State-
Department-led initiatives such as the Voice of America broadcasting service, goodwill 
ambassador tours featuring jazz musicians and integrated bands, and correspondence and 
reports from State Department officials highlighting the effects of American culture abroad 
through jazz diplomacy. The chapter also presents an outline of jazz diplomacy tours from 1956 
through the late 1960s, which is when the program was aborted due to budgetary and financial 
expenditure.  
Chapter 3 covers the state of race relations in the United States during the 1950s by 
examining effects of the 1957 Little Rock Crisis on cultural diplomacy. The domestic and 
international experiences of African American jazz musicians and integrated bands are 
discussed alongside civil rights issues that plagued African Americans at the time. The chapter 
also discusses landmark civil rights events that moved jazz musicians to speak up or act against 
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U.S. propaganda, painting a different image of racial unity from what the State Department 
sought to convey through propaganda documentation abroad. 
Chapter 4 will present a textual analysis of the musical The Real Ambassadors exploring 
racial tension and political propaganda, as witnessed by the musical’s creators and 
collaborators. The Real Ambassadors, with music by Dave Brubeck and libretto by his wife Iola, 
was able to capture the often complicated and sometimes contradictory politics of the State 
Department cultural diplomacy tours. The musical was created as a satire of State Department 
objectives, personnel, and protocol, and is a representation of “a powerful and unequivocal 
indictment of Jim Crow America.”22  
Much of scholarship on The Real Ambassadors has discussed and presented the musical 
as an aside within jazz diplomacy scholarship. In a performance setting, the musical has not 
been performed since the early 2000s, nor has it received its due recognition and spotlight as a 
political satire set to music. The purpose of this thesis is to bring to the reader’s attention how 
the musical is deeply political, voicing creative dissent against a controlled narrative presented 
in state-sponsored cultural propaganda. The Real Ambassadors received much critical acclaim 
after its 1962 debut as a jazz musical with its swinging juxtaposition of disparate musical styles. 
However, there has been very little scholarship on the significance of the musical’s libretto as a 
work of art for social and cultural commentary and criticism of U.S. cultural diplomacy during 
the Cold War. The textual analysis will attempt to disclose the satire portrayed throughout the 
musical, and expose the state of U.S. cultural diplomacy and race relations during the Cold War. 
                                                        
22    Penny M. Von Eschen, “The Real Ambassadors,” in Satchmo Meets Amadeus, edited by 
Reinhold Wagnleitner (Innsbruck, Germany: Studienverlag. 2006), 97.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Jazz and State Department Cultural Diplomacy during the 1950s-60s 
 
 
The State Department has discovered jazz. 
It reaches folks like nothing ever has. 
No commodity is quite so strange /  
As this thing called Cultural Exchange. 
Louis Armstrong, The Real Ambassadors  
"Cultural Exchange" 
 
Understanding the beginnings of cultural diplomacy in the United States requires 
knowledge of Cold War broadcasting and propaganda initiatives set in place during and after 
the Second World War. Frances Stonor Saunders defines propaganda during the Cold War as 
“organized effort or movement to disseminate information… by means of news, special 
arguments, or appeals designed to influence the thoughts and actions of any given group.”23 
While the beginning of cultural diplomacy may be traced to the founding of the USIA in 1953, 
the first formal structures in American cultural diplomacy were established largely through 
radio broadcasting during and after the Second World War. While European nations and the 
Soviet Union established official broadcasting services and cultural diplomacy programming 
during the Interwar period, the Roosevelt administration focused on the creation of a 
presidential “fireside chat” series on radio to promote New Deal programs during that time, 
with potential for expanding services to include international broadcasting and cultural 
programming using radio services.24 In 1935, the State Department began to transmit the daily 
                                                        
23 Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 4. 
24 Nicholas Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American  
Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
10-11. The Soviet Union’s international radio broadcast began in 1927 with the founding of 
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Radio Bulletin to foreign mission offices, which eventually led to the creation of the State 
Department Division of the Cultural Relations in 1938. The goal of this office was to work in 
conjunction with the Secretary of State and begin cultural outreach to Latin American countries 
as Europeans and the Soviet Union were slowly approaching same with political propaganda, 
but the initiative never took ground.25    
With the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, President Roosevelt identified the 
need to create cultural and political alliances with other nations, and established the Office of 
the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Affairs in August 1940.26 This new office was led by 
young oil magnate and philanthropist Nelson Rockefeller, his official title being Coordinator for 
Commercial and Cultural Relations. An executive order in 1941 renamed the agency as the 
Office of the Inter-American Affairs (OIAA). Rockefeller developed commercial and cultural 
projects in Latin America by creating libraries, cultural exchanges, and lecture programs.27 The 
OIAA was the first U.S. agency to transmit American news and features abroad via shortwave 
                                                        
Radio Moscow to mark the tenth anniversary of the Russian Revolution with a series of 
propaganda broadcasts. Prior to that, France had launched an official cultural program in 1923, 
followed by fascist Italy’s first cultural institute overseas in 1926. When Hitler came to power in 
1933, Germany spent substantial resources on cultural propaganda, to which England 
responded with its own national cultural foundation The British Council in 1934. In such 
circumstances, the United States needed to prepare for cultural diplomacy with its own 
broadcasting avenues supporting a two-fold mission of domestic publicity for presidential 
programs as well as overseas broadcasting.   
25 Ibid., 11-12. More information on charge and mission of the initiative can be found in 
University of Arkansas Special Collections, State Department Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Relations (CU) archival documents; for scholarly analysis, see Frank A. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy 
of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), 24-55; Richard T. Arndt, The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in 
the Twentieth Century (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 49-74.  
26 Ibid., 12. 
27 Ibid.  
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radio.28 In 1941, with global warfare on the horizon, Roosevelt created the Office of the 
Coordinator of Information for potential wartime information services and propaganda abroad; 
the agency was led by war hero Colonel William “Wild Bill” Donovan.29 This new agency was 
responsible for intelligence and special operations, including the Foreign Information Service 
(FIS) led by Roosevelt's speechwriter Robert Sherwood. The FIS took an active role in 
propaganda and information services abroad after the attack on Pearl Harbor, launching its first 
international shortwave radio broadcast in Europe with the Voice of America (VOA) radio 
station in December 1941.30 Soon afterwards, the U.S. officially declared its participation in the 
Second World War, and VOA programs were replaced with wartime news services, which would 
last through the end of the war.31 In spring of 1946, with wartime broadcasting coming to an 
end, VOA programming returned to “information pertaining to American life, policy, industry, 
techniques, culture, and customs” under growing ideological tension between the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union.32 With the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (Public Law 80-
                                                        
28 Ibid., 13; The agency worked with U.S. commercial radio networks and Hollywood film 
producers - Walt Disney being one - to develop “readymade programs” for Latin American 
stations. This approach received mixed responses, with some criticizing American stations as 
“bombastic” and “sugar coated” compared to the “honest, frank, and uncolored” European 
radio stations. For more information on Rockefeller’s career with OIAA, see Cary Reich, The Life 
of Nelson A. Rockefeller, Worlds to Conquer, 1908-1958 (New York: Doubleday, 1996).    
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 14. For an overview of the history of Voice of America and Cold War broadcasting, see 
Robert William Pirsein, The Voice of America: A History of the International Broadcasting 
Activities of the United States Government 1940-1962 (New York: Arno Press, 1979); Holly 
Cowan Shulman, The Voice of America: Propaganda and Democracy, 1941-1945 (Madison, WI: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1990).  
31 Ibid., 15-16.   
32 Ibid., 31; Harry S. Truman Library, Charles M. Hulten papers, box 15, Voice of America 1946-7, 
folders 1 and 3, Origins of International Broadcasting Activities of the U.S., Benton to Weiner et 
al., Bracken to Benton, 28 March 1946.   
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402, also known as the Smith-Mundt Act) in place, the VOA continued its programming abroad 
during peacetime under State Department jurisdiction.33 In 1954, the VOA was placed under 
the administrative control of the newly-created USIA since the agency’s mission directly lined 
up with programming already underway with VOA.34  
Cultural programing under the State Department contributed to the resurgence of 
mainstream jazz as an American art form, especially at a time when Bebop was the more 
dominant jazz style.35 Popular magazines such as Down Beat, Life, and Esquire featured articles 
on jazz as an art form, compared to its previous popularity as folk or dance music, and the 
media continued to highlight the genre as an American invention, which later positioned jazz 
well within U.S. cultural programming during the Cold War.36 To strike down Soviet propaganda 
                                                        
33 United States Information and Education Exchange Act of 1948, Public Law 80-402, 27 
January 1948. The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 permanently established the United States 
propaganda campaign, including cultural exchange programs, to “promote a better 
understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding 
between the people of the United States and [other countries by disseminating] information 
about the United States, its people, and its policies” through press, publications, radio, motion 
pictures and other information media. The “interchange of developments in education, the 
arts, and sciences” - cultural diplomacy - would fall under the “Educational Exchange” 
component of the act. More information on the Act, its objectives, and definitions can be found 
here: http://legisworks.org/congress/80/publaw-402.pdf 
34 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 90-91; Dwight E. Eisenhower 
Presidential Library, President’s Advisory Committee on Government Organization, box 79, No. 
91, International Affairs, 1953, memorandum for President Eisenhower, #14, Foreign Affairs 
Organization, 9 April 1953. While the VOA was the official radio broadcasting service for the 
U.S., other radio programs such as Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, which were privately-
funded and based in Europe but with a similar mission to VOA, were in operation at the time. 
35    Iain Anderson, “The Resurgence of Jazz in the 1950s,” in This Is Our Music: Free Jazz, the  
Sixties, and American Culture (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 11. 
Anderson cites that Bebop musicians’ “risky” life style involving language, behavior, dress, and 
recurring association with drugs led to a public misconception of “deviant outsiders,” which 
was perhaps an image that the State Department was not willing to get behind.  
36 Ibid., 10-11. Examples of jazz reception in print media include a Down Beat article titled “Jazz 
Achieves Social Prestige” and a photo spread on Life magazine titled “ New Life for U.S. Jazz,” 
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of jazz as culturally “barbarous,” the State Department turned to jazz as a propaganda tool first 
with radio and then with cultural programming abroad.37 The strategy was further supported by 
President Harry S. Truman’s “Campaign of Truth,” which was announced in 1950, to mitigate 
Soviet policy of “deceit, distortion, and lies” and improve and strengthen a range of 
informational, educational, and cultural services as part of Cold War propaganda.38 For cultural 
education of allies, enemies, and neutral newly-independent countries, the VOA, under the 
State Department’s administration, featured a radio show titled Jazz Club USA from 1950-52, 
which was hosted by jazz producer and broadcaster Leonard Feather.39 While the program only 
lasted a couple of years, radio jazz had become immensely popular abroad drawing a large jazz-
loving audience all over the world. This success led to the creation of a regular jazz program on 
VOA when the governance of the radio agency moved from the State Department to the USIA 
in 1954. In 1955, a jazz radio program “aimed at Scandinavia but reaching the U.S.S.R” was 
proposed, and Willis Conover was hired to be its resident disc jockey.40 Music U.S.A. Jazz Hour 
premiered on 6 January 1955 with its opening theme of Duke Ellington’s “Take the A Train” 
                                                        
both in 1955, and a twenty page feature and photo special on Esquire titled “The Golden Age of 
Jazz,” which was published a few years later.  
37 Ibid., 11. 
38    Harry S. Truman, ‘‘Going Forward with a Campaign of Truth,’’ Department of State Bulletin 
22 (May 1, 1950): 669, 671. The Campaign of Truth affirmed U.S. foreign policy during the Cold 
War, and acknowledged the importance of government programs to maintain allies and 
influence neutral countries in America’s favor.  
39 Anderson, “The Resurgence of Jazz in the 1950s,” 11. For more information on the career of 
Leonard Feather, see “Music is Combating Communism: The Voice of America shows bring 
Universal Harmony,” Down Beat, 8 October 1952; Leonard Feather, The Jazz Years: Eyewitness 
to an Era (New York: Da Capo, 1987). For more information on Jazz Club USA and its playlist, see 
http://otrrlibrary.org/OTRRLib/Library%20Files/J%20Series/Jazz%20Club%20USA/Jazz%20Club
%20USA%20-%20Tracklist.pdf 
40 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 107.  
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followed by the voice of host and jazz expert Willis Conover. For the next forty years, Conover 
hosted Music U.S.A. Jazz Hour six nights a week with 45 minutes of popular music followed by 
45 minutes of jazz. In 1962, a New York Times article lauded Conover’s radio show for putting 
jazz on the map and successfully spreading American values all over the world better than 
broadcasting service had done to date.41      
While the State Department and its agencies directly involved with propaganda and 
information services were open with their cultural programming, some government officials 
retreated to “covert” operations to keep originating agency and its intentions hidden from 
foreign allies as well as enemies. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), for example, covertly 
carried out operations and funded cultural programs from 1950-1967, one of which was the 
Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) headed by CIA agent Michael Josselson.42 Using news 
services, print media, musical performances and competitions, touring art exhibitions, 
international conferences, and cultural presentations, the CCF, with funding from CIA, 
emphasized American culture to the “intellectual” Western world.43  
As a parallel to CCF programming, the U.S. Cultural Presentations program formally 
began as the President’s Emergency Fund for International Affairs in 1954, and came to a close 
in the early 1970s due to shrinking budgets and a decreasing number of artists showing interest 
in state-sponsored cultural diplomacy.44 The fund, first approved by Congress during President 
                                                        
41    Jack Gould, “Jazz on a Global Scale: Willis Conover Heard in Eighty Foreign Countries over 
Radio Broadcasts by ‘Voice of America’ Network,” The New York Times (21 October 1962), 147.  
42 Stoner Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 1. 
43 Ibid., 2-3. 
44    Danielle Fosler-Lussier, Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy (Oakland, CA: University of 
California Press, 2015), 2. 
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Eisenhower’s administration, received an annual allocation of $2.25 million for musical and 
dramatic presentations abroad and U.S. participation in international trade fairs.45 The program 
received relatively steady funding through 1962, and a total of 206 cultural tours to 113 
countries were recorded during the first eight years of the U.S. Cultural Presentations 
program.46 The State Department collaborated with the American National Theater and 
Academy (ANTA), a private organization promoting theatrical performances, to identify and 
recruit artists for U.S. Cultural Presentations.47 The ANTA established advisory panels for music, 
dance, and theater, with experts from each discipline, to recommend artists and provide 
evaluations of candidates proposed for cultural diplomacy tours. Once performers and their 
agents had expressed interest, each advisory panel met monthly to evaluate not only 
performers to be sent on official tours but also musicians and other artists touring abroad 
privately so that USIA field offices could be kept informed. ANTA’s Music Advisory Panel 
members included composer and critic Virgil Thomson; composer and director of the Eastman 
School of Music Howard Hanson; composer and director of the Juilliard School William 
Schuman; violist and orchestral conductor Milton Katims; music critics Alfred Frankenstein (San 
Francisco Chronicle), Jay Harrison (New York Herald Tribune), and Olin Downes (retired, New 
York Times); prominent music librarians Carleton Sprague Smith (New York Public Library) and 
Harold Spivacke (Library of Congress); musicologist and journalist Paul Henry Lang; and National 
Music Council President Edwin Hughes.48  
                                                        
45 Anderson, “The Resurgence of Jazz in the 1950s,” 15. 
46    Harvey Cohen, Duke Ellington’s America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 414. 
47 Fosler-Lussier, Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy, 10. 
48 Ibid., 23; Emily Abrams Ansari, “Shaping the Policies of Cold War Musical Diplomacy: An 
Epistemic Community of American Composers.” Diplomatic History 36, no. 1 (2012), 42. 
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Each advisory panel’s recommendations were reviewed by an inter-agency committee 
made up of officials from the State Department, USIA, Defense Department, CIA, and other 
cultural agencies.49 The State Department also solicited advice from a separate Advisory 
Committee on the Arts (ACA), whose role was to advise state officials on the effectiveness of 
the overall arts program. The ACA’s role was different from the advisory panels’ responsibilities 
and the inter-agency committee’s role; the advisory panels evaluated specific performers and 
their performance quality and behavior during tours abroad with a letter-grade based ranking 
system, while the inter-agency committee was directly tasked with cultural propaganda 
strategies for countries and regions that needed to be “cultivated” with American ideals and 
cultural influences.50 The State Department, in return, was expected to produce annual reports 
to Congress for continued fiscal and diplomatic support. Over time, officials in Washington 
recognized the special power in the U.S. Cultural Presentations program connecting foreign 
audiences with American culture through the arts.  
For music programming, members of the ACA and the ANTA Music Advisory Panel were 
drawn to art music for cultural diplomacy tours, crediting its appeal and recognition in Europe 
and countries with a colonial past to draw large crowds. Many of these advisers were invested 
in “high arts” as arts philanthropists, museum presidents, composers, and university professors, 
with a bias towards art music as representative of an “educated and cultured” society.51 The 
Music Advisory Panel had support from some State Department officials, who favored the tours 
                                                        
49 Fosler-Lussier, 10. Federal agencies represented include the Library of Congress, the 
Smithsonian Institute, the National Gallery of Art, and the Commission of Fine Arts. 
50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid., 16. 
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to be demonstrative of “American artists [that] are in the very forefront of the world’s artistic 
achievement.”52 The advisory panel evaluations were intended to identify and promote 
American performers with originality and “greatness” in cultural diplomacy tours, but as 
classical music experts, the Music Advisory Panel showed reluctance to include jazz artists, 
claiming that they were not necessarily qualified to make recommendations for jazz and 
popular music artists and groups. The State Department had received instructions from the 
Eisenhower administration to include jazz artists in Cultural Presentations as jazz and African 
American artists would help shape global perceptions of America’s race relations favorably. 
Fosler-Lussier points out that indirectly tackling sensitive issues was a typical feature of cultural 
diplomacy, and by programming African Americans jazz musicians and integrated bands in 
cultural diplomacy tours would strategically put an end to domestic and foreign media coverage 
of racial tension in the U.S.53 Members of the Music Advisory Panel were not as convinced; 
Virgil Thomson stated during a monthly meeting that the only reason to support tours by jazz 
musicians was because “the State Department boys have a mania for it.”54 This was one blatant 
instance of marginalizing jazz and jazz artists in cultural programming. Eighty-three percent of 
the groups approved by the ANTA Music Advisory Panel from 1954-63 were classical musicians 
or music groups.55 Though jazz was the second most funded genre in Cultural Presentations, 
                                                        
52 Ibid.; Department of State Instruction A-212 to American Embassy in Tokyo, CDF55-59 032 
Tucker/9-1757. 
53 Ibid., 19. 
54 Ansari, “Shaping the Policies of Cold War Musical Diplomacy,” 45; ANTA Music Advisory Panel 
meeting minutes, 2 December 1964, folder 19, box 99, Series 5: Committees and Panels for the 
Performing Arts, Group 2: Cultural Presentations Program, Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs Historical Collection, Special Collections, University of Arkansas Fayetteville. 
55 Ansari, 44-45. 
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jazz ensembles “never made up more than a third of the groups approved in any given year.”56 
Other reasons for marginalizing jazz in cultural presentations included its commercial quality 
compared to “the great symphonies,” and perpetuating Soviet stereotypes of “low-brow” and 
“market-driven” American culture with state-sponsored jazz tours. Advisory panelists tried to 
warrant their decision to leave out jazz from Cultural Presentations by citing The Guide to 
Cultural Presentations, a pamphlet delivered to field offices abroad; according to guidelines, 
musicians must be capable of entertaining or “pleasing” mass audiences without making it their 
sole purpose, and the performance must carry some form of artistic expression if the group was 
leaning towards a popular music style.57  
Having had no luck convincing the State Department against jazz in cultural diplomacy 
tours, in 1955, the Music Advisory Panel recruited jazz critic and founder of the Institute of Jazz 
Studies Marshall Stearns as a special consultant to assist with jazz programming, but there was 
no direction toward recruiting an African American or a practicing jazz musician until a separate 
subcommittee for folk and jazz music was formed in 1964.58 During the monthly meeting on 20 
December 1955, Stearns proposed to include Louis Armstrong, Duke Ellington, Dizzy Gillespie, 
Count Basie, and Stan Kenton and their bands in cultural diplomacy tours the following year. 
Gillespie’s band was the de facto choice for the first State Department jazz tour because 
Armstrong, Ellington, and Basie either had private tours in place or were not available to 
                                                        
56 Ansari, 44, based on analysis of ANTA Music Advisory Panel meeting minutes in the Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, Special Collections, University of Arkansas 
Fayetteville.  
57 Fosler-Lussier, Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy, 78. 
58 Ansari, “Shaping the Policies of Cold War Musical Diplomacy,” 45. 
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travel.59 The State Department promptly announced its decision to include African American 
jazz artists in cultural diplomacy tours with a press conference on the steps of the House Office 
Building; domestic and foreign media speculated the decision as “inclusive” propaganda in 
response to the Brown vs. Board of Education decision of 1954 and the recent lynching of 
Emmett Till in September 1955, both of which had attracted wide media coverage of 
unfavorable race relations in the United States.60 The State Department argued, however, that 
Gillespie’s band was the perfect representation of diverse and integrated American culture 
comprising of “blacks, whites, males, females, Jews, and Gentiles.”61 
Between 1956 and 1968, the State Department sponsored twenty-six cultural diplomacy 
tours with jazz musicians (Table 1). 57% of the tours were led by African American musicians, 
but four well-renowned African American jazz artists and their bands - Miles Davis, John 
Coltrane, Charles Mingus, and Thelonious Monk - were notably left out from the tours. The 
inter-agency committee made up of State Department officials had the final approval of artists 
on tour, and often excluded artists and groups based on reports from field offices on how 
artists may present themselves abroad, or due to a low score from the Music Advisory Panel 
evaluations.62  
 
 
                                                        
59 Ingrid Monson, Freedom Sounds: Civil Rights Call Out to Jazz and Africa (Oxford: Oxford  
University Press, 2007), 113. 
60 Ibid., 113-114. 
61 Ibid., 115. The full roster included Dizzy Gillespie, Joe Gordon, Emet Perry, Carl Warwick, and 
Quincy Jones on trumpet; Melba Liston, Frank Rehak, and Rod Levitt on trombone; Jimmy 
Powell and Phil Woods on alto saxophone; Billy Mitchell and Ernie Wilkins on tenor saxophone; 
Marty Flax on baritone saxophone; Walter Davis, Jr. on piano; Nelson Boyd on bass; and Charlie 
Persip on drums. 
62 Monson, Freedom Sounds, 123, 126. 
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Table 1. State Department Jazz Tours, 1956-196863  
Date Group led by Destination 
1956 Mar 21 – May 21 Dizzy Gillespie Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, 
United Arab Republic 
1956 July 26 – Aug 21 Dizzy Gillespie Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil 
1956 Dec 6 – 1957 Jan 17 Benny Goodman Thailand, Singapore, Burma, Japan, Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, Cambodia 
1957 Mar 4 – May 17 Wilbur De Paris Africa: Sudan, Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, 
Congo, Central African Republic, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Ethiopia, Libya, Tunisia 
1958 Mar 6 – May 9 Dave Brubeck Poland, Turkey, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq 
1958 Aug 10-31 Woody Herman Panama, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil, Jamaica, 
Honduras, Guatemala 
1958 Sep 26 – 1959 Jan 21 Jack Teagarden Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, 
Burma, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, 
Japan 
1959 Dec 31 – 1960 Apr 5 Herbie Mann Africa: Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria, 
Mozambique, Rhodesia, Nyasaland, 
Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, 
Morocco, Tunisia 
1960 Jan 4 – Mar 30 Red Nichols Greece, Turkey, Cypress, Palestine, 
Jordan, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, 
Sri Lanka, Nepal, United Arab Republic, 
Syria 
1960 Oct 25 – Dec 4 Louis Armstrong Africa: Cameroon, Congo, Uganda, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Togo, 
Ivory Coast, Senegal, Mali, Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, Sudan 
1961 Jan 10-29 Louis Armstrong Egypt 
1961 Mar 12 – May 27 Charlie Byrd Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, 
Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, 
Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, 
                                                        
63 Ibid., 124-125. Table 4.3 Department of State Cultural Presentations Program, jazz tours 
completed, 1956-1969, compiled from “Tours Completed from Beginning of Program in 1954 
through June 1968 (FY 1955-1968), Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Collection, 
subseries 1, General and Historical files, box 3, folder 10, “Cultural Presentations List of Groups, 
1954-1968. 
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Date Group led by Destination 
Honduras 
1962 Feb 6 – July 13 Paul Winter Haiti, Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, 
French West Indies, Nicaragua, Costa 
Rica, Chile, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, 
Paraguay, Brazil, Venezuela 
1962 May 30 – Jul 9 Benny Goodman Soviet Union 
1962 May 31 – Jun 4  Louis Armstrong Chile 
1962 Oct 15 – 1963 Mar 7 Cozy Cole Africa: Morocco, Senegal, Volta, Niger, 
Liberia, Ivory Coast, Congo, Chad, Central 
African Republic, Cameroon, Ghana, 
Togo, Guinea 
1963 Sep 6 – Nov 22 Duke Ellington Near East, South Asia: Syria, Jordan, 
Afghanistan, Indonesia, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan 
1965 Sep 5-24 Paul Winter Sextet Brazil 
1966 Mar 31 – Apr 9 Duke Ellington Africa: Senegal 
1966 Apr 1 – Jun 8 Woody Herman Africa: Tanzania, Uganda, Congo, Ivory 
Coast, Algeria; Yugoslavia, United Arab 
Republic, Romani 
1966 Jul 7 – Aug 17 Earl Hines Soviet Union 
1967 Jan 16 – Apr 9 Randy Weston Africa: Algeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, 
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Niger, 
Sierra Leone, Upper Volta; Lebanon, 
Egypt 
1967 Oct 12 – 22 Charles Lloyd Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania 
1967 Nov 13 – 1968 Jan 
20 
Junior Wells Africa: Dahomey, Togo, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Mali, Niger, Upper Volta, 
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Senegal, Guinea 
1968 Apr 1 – May 26 Charlie Byrd Korea, Japan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, 
Nepal, Sri Lanka, Philippines 
1968 Apr 29 – Jun 23 Charles Lloyd Okinawa, Hong Kong, Laos, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Singapore, Taiwan, Philippines 
 
While diplomacy has typically been associated with state officials in political or state-to-
state negotiations, cultural diplomacy dealt with average citizens serving as amateur diplomats  
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and goodwill ambassadors of American values and culture.64 Most musicians on cultural 
diplomacy tours received in-person briefings or printed information from the State Department 
prior to traveling abroad.65 Marshall Stearns, who had nominated Dizzy Gillespie’s band for the 
first jazz tour, was requested by the State Department to accompany Gillespie not only to 
deliver public lectures at foreign embassies but also “to keep an eye on Dizzy’s programs [to] 
maintain the standards that have been set for [jazz musicians].”66 Band member Quincy Jones 
recalled his interaction with an “arrogant and condescending” ANTA official, 
He came to rehearsal and stood in front of the band in a pretty wool suit and bow 
tie, and gave us advice in a flat, patronizing voice, saying, “I have nothing to tell 
you except that when you’re abroad, you’re representing our country. So please 
indulge in your various idiosyncrasies discreetly.”67 
 
While first-time tour participants received careful instructions about locals and local socio-
political conditions, high-profile musicians received minimal briefings or training before their 
tours. For example, the only instructions Duke Ellington and company received prior to their 
tour of Asia in 1963 was a single-spaced six-page document titled “Answering the Critic of the 
United States Abroad.”68 The document provided suggestions for finding common ground with 
a “foreign critic” by being calm and reasonable, answering with “yes, but,” and avoiding 
                                                        
64 The title song in the musical The Real Ambassadors explores the roles of political diplomats 
and goodwill ambassadors, rhetorically asking who the real ambassadors are. See Dave 
Brubeck, The Real Ambassadors: An Original Musical Production by Dave and Iola Brubeck, 
libretto (San Francisco, CA: Hansen Publications, 1963), 47-50.    
65 This is covered in the prologue to the song “Remember who you are.” See Brubeck, The Real 
Ambassadors, libretto, 21. 
66 Fosler-Lussier, Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy, 80; Robert Schnitzer, ANTA, to 
Marshall Stearns, 30 January 1956, box 12, folder 2, Marshall W. Stearns Collection, Institute of 
Jazz studies, Rutgers University Libraries. 
67 Jones, The Autobiography of Quincy Jones, 112. 
68 Cohen, Duke Ellington’s America, 428. 
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arguments with locals. The sub-section titled “Try to Get the Discussion out of an Exclusively 
American Context” provided explicit instructions on how to derail conversations about U.S. race 
relations with comments such as “it’s a universal problem for human beings all over the world,” 
taking the emphasis away from the U.S. Ellington’s band member and jazz trombonist Buster 
Cooper revealed in an interview that he received no instructions from the State Department, 
which led to him speaking his mind freely about U.S. race relations during the tour; it may well 
be that only the main artist, and not every band member, received official documents.69   
One of the drawbacks of amateur diplomats is the difficulty in making them stick to a 
script without preoccupations; in the case of college jazz musicians, they were often 
preoccupied with rehearsals and performances more so than following official narrative and 
agenda provided by the State Department. During the University of Michigan Jazz Band’s tour 
of Latin America in 1965, the State Department supplied political briefings in the form of 
pamphlets with titles such as “Democracy vs. Dictators” and “U.S. Policy toward Cuba.” The 
pamphlets were distributed right before the tour in early January, and many students 
complained that they did not have adequate time to read through material between winter 
break and rehearsals in preparation of the tour.70 While critics of cultural diplomacy tours 
questioned the State Department’s intent to recruit amateurs to represent the United States 
abroad, State Department officials were confident that amateurs and student performance 
                                                        
69 Ibid.; “Suggestions on Methods of Answering the Critic of the United State Abroad,” The 
Smithsonian Institute National Museum of American History Archives Center, Duke Ellington 
Collection #301, series 2A, box 2, folder 10; Interview of Buster Cooper with Patricia Willard, 29 
September 1989, Smithsonian Institute Ellington Oral History Project, tape 1.  
70 Fosler-Lussier, Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy, 14; Student Questionnaires, box 1, 
Richard Crawford Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.  
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groups could lure foreign audiences with their “frankness in conversation” and “generosity in 
sharing expertise,” showing evidence of American goodwill and “the excellence of the American 
educational system.”71 State Department officials also favored the emphasis on youth in 
programming, supporting many college-level jazz groups to travel as part of cultural diplomacy 
tours. Sending student musicians, as seen in La Paz, Bolivia during the University of Michigan 
Jazz Band tour, proved out to be an effective tool in building cultural relationships and forming 
continued cultural exchange; the tour resulted in American and Bolivian students making 
arrangements to form an educational exchange program with their institutions cultivating 
continued cultural relations.72 
 By August 1958, jazz was established as a mainstay of cultural diplomacy; an Operations 
Coordinating Board (OCB) report noted that “requests for jazz groups continue to be received” 
from youth audiences abroad. Despite high cost of tours and decreasing financial support from 
Congress, the State Department continued to support “one jazz group per area each year” as 
part of Cultural Presentations.73 By the summer of 1959, the administration and funding of 
diplomacy tours was placed under a new State Department agency: Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs (CU).74  
                                                        
71 Fosler-Lussier, 14. 
72 Ibid., 15-16. 
73 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 155; National Archives Record 
Group 306 64-A-0536, Director’s Office subject files, 1957-1958, box 5, President’s Emergency 
Fund, Inter Agency Committee on Presentation, 1958, OCB, “Report on Activities of the Cultural 
Presentation Committee,” 20 August 1958. For a detailed account of finances and budget 
allocations for the State Department jazz tours, see Monson, Freedom Sounds, 120-123. 
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The 1960s brought about many changes for civil rights, and the State Department 
supported the passing of the 1964 Civil Rights Act with an increasing number of African 
American jazz musicians on tour in addition to VOA programming including interviews of 
African American musicians with a lively current affairs segment.75 1962 was a memorable year 
for U.S.-Soviet relations as Benny Goodman became the first jazz musician to officially tour the 
Soviet Union representing the State Department. Although the Khrushchev thaw was in place, 
allowing artists from the West to travel to the Soviet Union, Soviets continued to wage a 
campaign against “decadent western abstract art,” and Goodman was the ideal candidate to 
represent the U.S. with his classical training behind jazz career.76 Due to locals protesting 
against Goodman’s “out of date” style and increasing tension during the Cuban missile crisis, 
which took place soon after Goodman’s tour, the Soviets did not accept another jazz tour until 
1966, with Earl Hines and his band, followed by Duke Ellington and his orchestra in 1971.77 
The impact of American jazz and jazz musicians was evident in artist memoirs and 
official correspondences from field offices throughout the course of the jazz diplomacy tours. In 
a 2011 interview with Monk Rowe, Iola Brubeck recalled her observations of jazz-loving 
audiences during Dave Brubeck’s 1958 state department tour,  
In Poland, jazz just became this symbol of the freedom that they wanted and were 
seeking, and so it was an underground movement that for some time was 
                                                        
75 Ibid., 236. The VOA Music U.S.A. Jazz Hour by Willis Conover remained popular throughout 
these transitions and changes to programming.  
76 Penny M. Von Eschen, “Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz, Race, and Empire during the Cold  
War,” In Here, There, and Everywhere: The Foreign Politics of American Popular Culture, edited 
by Elaine T. May and Reinhold Wagnleitner (Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New 
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forbidden. And by the time, in 1958, when the quartet went there, it had loosened 
up a little bit so there could be jazz societies.78  
 
 The State Department’s eagerness to frame jazz as representative of American values 
and the use of African American jazz musicians and integrated bands as representative of racial 
harmony and equality contributed to the success of U.S. cultural diplomacy. State Department 
cultural diplomacy tours helped to institutionalize jazz and include the genre in the American 
arts canon. Whether or not American jazz musicians “intended to subvert” their government, 
their actions and message of goodwill supported the image that the State Department desired 
to project cultural diplomacy tours.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
78    Monk Rowe, Oral History Interview with Iola Brubeck, Fillius Jazz Archives Interviews, 
Hamilton College Library (July 17, 2011), 2. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Race Relations and United States Cultural Diplomacy during the 1950s-60s 
 
 
And If [God] cared if you’re black or white, 
He’d mixed one color, one just right. 
When will that great day come / when everyone is one 
[And] God tells Man he’s really free. 
Louis Armstrong, The Real Ambassadors  
"They say I look like God" 
 
United States cultural propaganda during the Cold War aimed to showcase mainstream 
jazz and African American artists as proof of improving race relations and status in American 
life, but the same propaganda failed to deceive international audiences at times, much to the 
surprise of government officials. Jazz diplomacy under state sponsorship began as a result of 
progress in the civil rights movement, beginning with the Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of 
Education decision in 1954 ending the separate-but-equal doctrine.79 The Brown decision 
marked a victory for African Americans, and in response to this civil rights landmark event, the 
Eisenhower administration included African Americans in cultural diplomacy to articulate a 
narrative of racial progress.80 With racial equality as a goal, the State Department and USIA 
increased African American representation in cultural diplomacy tours as a strategy to mitigate 
international criticism of domestic racial issues.81  
                                                        
79 For more information on Jim Crow segregation laws and the separate-but-equal doctrine, see 
Lili Kunfalvi, Separate but Equal: Racial Segregation in the United States (Institute of Cultural 
Policy, 2014), http://culturalrelations.org/Resources/2014/ICRP_Human_Rights_Issues_2014-
02.pdf, (Accessed 1 August 2017) 
80    Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 13. 
81 Ibid. 
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While African American goodwill ambassadors such as Louis Armstrong and Dizzy 
Gillespie were spreading American ideals of freedom and democracy abroad during cultural 
diplomacy tours, racial tension and isolated incidents of segregation were very much the reality 
(and still continue to be!) for African Americans fighting for equality. On 4 September 1957, a 
major civil rights event challenged the United States portrayal of racial equality and democracy 
in the eyes of the world, when nine African American high school students attempting to enroll 
at Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas were prevented from entering the school 
premises by order of Arkansas governor Orval Faubus.82 Faubus’ orders directly violated the 
1954 Brown vs. Board of Education Supreme Court decision to end school segregation starting 
with the 1957-58 school year.83 As the crisis deepened with protests and rallies, domestic and 
international media coverage of the event also increased. President Eisenhower and his 
administration got involved with the crisis by deploying the Federal National Guard to Little 
Rock to escort the Little Rock Nine into the high school. Newspapers around the world covered 
the incident with images of African American children next to federal troops holding loaded 
rifles (Figure 1). 
                                                        
82 Ibid., 115. For a detailed account of the 1957 Central High School crisis and its reception 
around the world, see Dudziak, 115-151. 
83 Ibid., 115-117.  
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Figure 1.  Armed troops escort African American students into Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, 1957.84 
 
In an interview with the Arkansas Gazette, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
condemned domestic media for inaccurately portraying events and claimed that these 
“desegregation battles” were not helpful for the United States image abroad, especially since 
Radio Moscow had been “chirping happily about the troubles of integration.”85 Coverage of the 
1957 Little Rock Crisis became a highlight for international media from The London Times, to 
                                                        
84 Armed troops escort African American students from Central High School in Little Rock, 
Arkansas, 3 October 1957, Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, 
https://www.loc.gov/item/94505568/ (Accessed August 1, 2017.) 
85 Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 118; Arkansas Gazette, 11 September 1957, 2A. 
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the Times of India, the South China Morning Post and other media outlets carrying updates on 
the story for the entire month of September. According to the U.S. field office in Brussels, the 
story received great interest among the Belgian press “far greater than any other American 
domestic issue in recent years.”86 While the media criticized Eisenhower’s delayed action to 
respond to the crisis, the State Department came up with a propaganda document to 
disseminate to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations and field offices abroad outlining 
strategies for responding to international criticism.87  
The white paper titled “Talking Points to Overcome Adverse Reactions to Little Rock 
Incident” emphasized that the process of school desegregation in most states had not been as 
contentious as in Little Rock, Arkansas, and talking points covered “marked progress toward 
integration” and “tremendous strides” being made in removing racial barriers in the U.S.88 The 
document also stressed that there was “growth in homeownership and rising income levels 
among non-whites,” pointing to economic improvements in the lives of African Americans.89 
This was not the only instance the State Department commented on African Americans quality 
of life. In November 1957, after Secretary of Labor James Mitchell sent Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles a copy of his article “The Negro Moves Up,” which was due for publication in the 
                                                        
86 Ibid., 119; U.S. Embassy, Brussels, to Department of State, 1 October 1957. Record Group 58, 
811.411/10-157, National Archives. For international coverage of the crisis, see Orval Faubus, 
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87 Dudziak, 142; Department of State Instruction no. CA-3382, 10 October, 1957, Record Group 
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88 Ibid. 
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Archives Record Group 59, 811.411/10-159, Berding, Memorandum to Rubottom, 1 October 
1957.  
  
32 
 
December 1957 issue of the Reader’s Digest, Dulles responded that “this comprehensive report 
with its impressive background of statistical facts should clear up a lot of misunderstanding 
overseas.”90  
The final paragraph of the “Talking Points” document provided a revealing glimpse into 
the concerns of the authors of the document:  
In the United States, national authority is being used not to suppress individual 
equality and freedom but to uphold them. In the Little Rock incident national 
authority was invoked to maintain [the] equal rights of a minority. In the Soviet 
Union national authority has been repeatedly invoked to suppress the rights of 
minorities.91 
 
According to U.S. Foreign Policy historian Cary Fraser, this concluding statement clarifies the 
need to avoid parallels being drawn between Soviet policies and the U.S. government’s actions 
in the aftermath of the 1957 Little Rock Crisis.92 To continue portraying a positive and unified 
image of the United States abroad (and also for damage control purposes), the USIA distributed 
pictures of integrated schools and accomplishments of African Americans to field offices as part 
of information services propaganda.93 Despite the public relations “hiccup” during the 1957 
Little Rock Crisis, the State Department continued its cultural diplomacy efforts with an 
emphasis on “Americana” themed activities with funding support from private foundations 
such as the Ford Foundation. This new funding model helped to create American studies 
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programs in European universities and create and fund American Studies faculty positions and 
exchange programs with American academic institutions.94   
At the turn of the century, African American activist and intellectual W.E.B Du Bois 
predicted that the politics surrounding race in the United States - “the color line, the relation of 
the darker to the lighter races of men” - would drive domestic and foreign policy decisions 
during the 20th century.95 The 1957 Little Rock Crisis was an apt illustration of Du Bois’s 
prediction, but was not the first occasion where policy decisions were made as a result of racial 
tension in the U.S. In the fall of 1946, during the United National (UN) General Assembly in New 
York City, a foreign policy crisis nearly erupted due to several New York hotels refusing to 
accommodate UN delegations from Haiti, Liberia, and Ethiopia due to Jim Crow segregation.96 
The U.S. Ambassador to the UN had to intervene by meeting with the hotel board, who agreed 
to accept the African delegates but not the Haitians. In the end, the State Department had to 
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secure accommodation for the Haitians and prevent the scandal from being publicized in local 
and international media.97  
While the 1957 Little Rock Crisis would become a defining moment in American foreign 
policy, it was not the first civil rights event during Eisenhower’s presidency to gain international 
attention. The world watched the verdict in the brutal murder of Emmett Till in October 1955, 
with international media weighing in. The field office in Paris, France reported to the State 
Department that the French media were giving “wide coverage to the Till case, vociferously 
condemning the verdict.”98 An all-white jury in Mississippi had acquitted the accused murderers 
of Till, an African American teenager from Chicago who had supposedly whistled and touched a 
white woman.99 A few months later, in early 1956, the field office in Copenhagen, Denmark 
reported to the State Department that the case of Autherine Lucy, a young African American 
woman who was denied admission into the University of Alabama, had gained attention from 
the Danish press and local university officials. Field officials also reported that the 
administration and students from two Danish universities (Copenhagen and Aarhus), with 
support from a local paper, had telegraphed their support and sympathy to Miss Lucy, and had 
even offered financial assistance for her to complete studies at the University of Copenhagen. 
The State Department officials blamed domestic media coverage for exacerbating the situation 
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and damaging the American image after “such tragedies as the Emmett Till case and the 
unfortunate riots attending Miss Lucy’s efforts.”100 The State Department continued to 
disseminate propaganda documents as official statements for field mission offices abroad in the 
wake of international media coverage of U.S. civil rights events such as the Emmett Till verdict 
in 1955, Montgomery bus boycott in 1955-56, and Autherine Lucy’s denial of admission in 1956. 
However, African Americans involved with cultural diplomacy tours faced a difficult position in 
continuing to represent the State Department and American values while experiencing racial 
injustices and discrimination at home.   
Louis Armstrong was perhaps the most prominent African American jazz musician 
repeatedly requested to travel abroad as part of the State Department cultural diplomacy 
tours. Armstrong, who rarely spoke out about racial issues, was vocal during the aftermath of 
the 1957 Little Rock Crisis and called off his imminent State Department tour to the Soviet 
Union. On 19 September 1957, the New York Times reported the news with the headline: “Louis 
Armstrong, Barring Soviet Tour, Denounces Eisenhower and Gov. Faubus.” In the article, 
Armstrong declared, “the way they are treating my people in the South, the government can go 
to hell... It’s getting almost so bad a colored man hasn’t got any country.”101 A few days later, 
Armstrong remarked in a Pittsburgh Courier article: 
I wouldn’t take back a thing I’ve said. I’ve had a beautiful life over forty years in 
music, but I feel the downtrodden situation the same as any other Negro. My 
parents and family suffered through all of that Old South… My people, the 
Negroes, are not looking for anything. We just want a square shake. But when I 
see on television and read about a crowd spitting on and cursing at a little colored 
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girl, I think I have a right to get sore and say something about it. After all, America 
is my country, too, and I’ve always tried to do anything I could to help it.102 
 
Armstrong also criticized President Eisenhower for being “two-faced [and] allowing the 
Governor of Arkansas to run the Federal government.” As for Faubus, Armstrong called his 
actions “a publicity stunt by the greatest of all publicity hounds.”103 
In multiple interviews, Armstrong repeatedly stated that the goodwill tours should 
target American audiences before reaching out to Communist regions. That sentiment later 
made its way into one of the songs in the musical The Real Ambassadors: “Look here, what we 
need is a goodwill tour of Mississippi. Forget Moscow, when do we play New Orleans?”104 As an 
example corroborating Armstrong’s comments, Dizzy Gillespie and his band was the first jazz 
group and integrated band to travel abroad representing the State Department tours, but his 
band would not have been welcomed in Athens, Georgia despite success in Athens, Greece. It 
was far from amusing to African Americans such as Dizzy Gillespie to represent America’s 
freedom abroad while they continued to live in a segregated society at home. In his 
autobiography-biography, Gillespie recalled his response to State Department propaganda 
reinforcing equal opportunities for all Americans: “I sort’ve liked the idea of representing 
America, but I wasn’t going to apologize for the racist policies.”105 Gillespie purposely avoided 
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his pre-tour briefing stating that “he’s got three hundred years of briefing,” as a reference to 
African American history of racial oppression, and did not hesitate to promote his own version 
of America while on tour.106 Needless to say, the State Department did not appreciate 
Gillespie’s off-scripted comments on race and U.S. foreign policy. It would take another 
eighteen years before Gillespie was invited to travel abroad for his second jazz diplomacy 
tour.107 
The 1957 Little Rock Crisis also created a chain of events in the U.S. and abroad limiting 
opportunities for African American musicians to continue in Cultural Presentations. From 1957 
to 1960, State Department officials showed reluctance to send all-Black jazz groups on tour, and 
opted for integrated and all-White bands to travel abroad representing the State Department. 
Further proof can be found in correspondence from field offices; an official from Rio, Brazil 
requested Woody Herman’s band, while the field office in Czechoslovakia pointed to the 
popularity of the Dave Brubeck Quartet.108 In Poland, Edward A. Symans, attaché in Warsaw, 
argued that a White jazz group “would rekindle waning sentiments and strongly reinforce 
relationships still alive.”109 As far Africa, numerous requests were made from field offices in 
Senegal and Congo proposing Louis Armstrong for the next State Department jazz tour. Due to 
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Armstrong’s recent dissent against the Eisenhower administration, the State Department 
decided to send Dave Brubeck and band on a tour of Asia, Europe, and the Middle East in 
1958.110 Brubeck’s quartet had been recently integrated with African American bass player 
Eugene Wright with the remaining three members being White (Brubeck on piano, Paul 
Desmond on alto saxophone, Joe Morello on drums); this may have increased the group’s 
eligibility to represent the State Department as an integrated band.  
Brubeck was a surprising choice for the 1958 tour as his style was identified in a Time 
magazine article from November 1954 as West Coast modern jazz with growing popularity and 
profitability. The article described Brubeck as a “new kind of jazz artist” for his intellectualism 
and commitment to a family life.111 A combination of originality and artistry together with 
growing media attention made Dave Brubeck and his band the ideal candidate to represent 
American culture appealing to “high culture” audiences in Eastern Europe.112 While Brubeck 
had a successful cultural diplomacy tour abroad, his quartet had difficulty scheduling 
performances at universities in the South because of the band’s integrated nature. For 
example, the University of Georgia’s policy for visiting integrated groups requested that Black 
members be replaced with White members, which Brubeck refused to do; in doing so, the band 
reportedly lost forty-thousand dollars during the entire tour season.113 For Brubeck, the choice 
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presented to him and his band was “unconstitutional” and “ridiculous,” and the quartet’s White 
members demanded that university authorities modify policy to allow integrated groups to 
“play music without intimidation or pressure.”114 Gene Wright added, “It’s a shame we can go 
travel all over the world and not have problems, and some have such a ‘silly problem’.”115  
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CHAPTER 4 
The Real Ambassadors 
 
 
The Real Ambassador is a story about jazz and jazz musicians in the context of cultural 
exchange and race relations in the United States during the 1950s. The co-creators of the 
musical, Dave Brubeck and wife Iola, drew on theirs and others' experiences from touring the 
world in 1958, on behalf of the U.S. State Department. The scholarly and serious Brubeck was 
starting to be recognized as an important jazz composer, pianist, and leader of the highly-
acclaimed Dave Brubeck Quartet. His wife Iola was an actress, poet, and writer.116 
The Brubecks, alongside Louis Armstrong, Dizzy Gillespie, Duke Ellington, and others, 
were part of the official State Department tours to spread American culture and arts during the 
early Cold War years. The primary mission of cultural diplomacy jazz tours were to reach 
countries whose allegiances were not well defined, or who were at risk of aligning with the 
Soviet Union. As the title of the musical states, The Real Ambassadors was about the role these 
jazz musicians played as cultural ambassadors for their country. Among actual events 
referenced directly or indirectly in the musical are Greek student riots outside the U.S. Embassy 
in Greece and their resolution during Dizzy Gillespie’s 1956 State Department tour, and 
Armstrong calling off his official State Department tour to the Soviet Union as a result of the 
Eisenhower administration’s handling of the 1957 Central High School Crisis in Little Rock, 
Arkansas. 
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The librettist of the musical, Iola Brubeck, once stated, “Dave [Brubeck] says The Real 
Ambassadors is a Broadway version of a jazz show,” referring to the true emotional quality of 
jazz and ironic wit in Broadway portrayed in the musical.117 Iola began working on the libretto 
shortly after Dizzy Gillespie and his band returned from the first State Department jazz tour in 
1956, but much of the lyrics were completed after accompanying her husband Dave and his 
band during the State Department tour in 1958.118 Jazz was finally receiving its long-overdue 
recognition with federal funding, leading to the possibility to a musical highlighting a cultural 
exchange tour and associated racial and societal issues. After five years of "writing, rewriting, 
and waiting", the first rehearsal and five subsequent recording sessions in 1961 led to a cast 
album of musical selections under Brubeck’s own label Columbia Records (COL CL 5850), which 
was released in 1962.119 In 1994, song selections from the LP cast album were re-released with 
the same album title, by Sony Music Entertainment on the Columbia/Legacy label (CK 57663).  
The 1962 original cast album was produced by Teo Macero, and performers included 
The Dave Brubeck Trio (Brubeck on piano, bassist Eugene Wright, drummer Joe Morello), Louis 
Armstrong and his band (including trombonist Trummy Young, pianist Billy Kyle, clarinetist Joe 
Darensbourg, Willy Kronk, and drummer Danny Barcelona), vocal trio Lambert-Hendricks-Ross, 
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and jazz vocalist Carman McRae.120 The libretto with fifteen songs and related narration from 
The Real Ambassadors was printed in 1963 and published by Hansen Publications. Iola 
recognized Louis Armstrong as the perfect candidate to play the lead role:  
His horn [was] his crown and scepter... Anyone who has been caught in Louis' 
spell can really believe that if he were to blast three times 'round, the walls 
of hate would come tumbling down!121 
 
This statement comes directly from the lyrics of the song Blow, Satchmo, where Armstrong's 
horn, compared to the biblical story of Joshua's horn bringing down the walls of Jericho, would 
lead those fighting for racial equality "to that promised land."122 In her commentary 
accompanying cast album recording, Iola also reminisced about the choice of company singers 
and musicians that would be featured in the musical: 
Carmen McRae was our immediate choice to play opposite Louis... Obviously, 
no vocal group but Lambert-Hendricks-Ross could manage to sound like a 
crowd or a full chorus on demand.123      
 
The musical’s first public performance was in the form of a revue of ten tunes at the 
Monterey Jazz Festival in 1962, with Iola Brubeck in the narrator role and the album cast 
(except Annie Ross, who was replaced by Yolande Bavan).124 Brubeck commented on the 
performance’s reviews,  
[Ralph] Gleason and [Leonard] Feather weren’t [always] kind to me, [but] they 
flipped over it. They had tears in their eyes after the concert, and said they felt it 
was the greatest thing ever done at Monterey. The most critical jazz audience in 
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the world rose as one body to give Louis Armstrong and the cast a standing 
ovation. It was an electrifying moment.125 
 
While the musical was written as a Broadway show, it never made to Broadway. During a 2007 
interview with Shan Sutton, Head of Special Collection and Curator of the Brubeck Oral History 
Project at University of the Pacific Library, Dave and Iola Brubeck cited the cost of production 
and race relations at the time as reasons for why the musical was never performed in full in a 
commercial venue. Iola specifically credited the Brubecks’ (and Louis Armstrong's) manager Joe 
Glaser’s opinion of concert tours being more lucrative than time and production cost spent for 
a Broadway show. As for race relations, both Iola and Dave stressed that the emphasis on racial 
issues and government criticism were possible reasons for no producers stepping up to 
promote the show beyond its premiere.126   
In 2002, the musical returned to the Monterey Jazz Festival to celebrate its 40th 
anniversary with the Dave Brubeck Quartet (now saxophonist Bobby Militello, Brubeck on 
piano, bassist Michael Moore, and drummer Randy Jones), jazz singer Lizz Wright, Roy Hargrove 
and Byron Stripling on trumpet, Christian McBride on bass, Chris Brubeck on trombone, and 
vocalists Lynne Fiddmont, Lamont VanHook, and Fred White.127 Selections from the musical 
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returned to the stage again in April 2014 for its first performance in New York City as part of the 
Jazz at Lincoln Center series, this time featuring Yolande Bavan in the role of narrator.128 
The Real Ambassadors contains ballads, jump tunes, and patter songs, offering a variety 
in its musical content within the jazz style. The musical is in many ways a tribute to Louis 
Armstrong for taking a stance during the 1957 Central High School Crisis. Iola later recalled, 
“[When] we got into this project we really didn’t know Louis that well, but we sensed in him a 
depth and an unstated feeling we thought we could tap into, without being patronizing, and I 
think that’s why he took [the role].129 Casting Armstrong as the musical’s hero and leading star 
was the Brubecks' way of recognizing his impact on foreign audiences as a jazz and goodwill 
ambassador. Iola intended for the libretto to satirize State Department objectives, personnel, 
and protocol, and voice “an unequivocal indictment of Jim Crow America.”130 For Armstrong, 
however, some of the song selections presented an opportunity to address many of the racial 
issues he had struggled with throughout his career. The song They Say I Look Like God had a 
particular effect on Armstrong, as Dave Brubeck recalled in a 2009 interview:  
Now, we wanted the audience to chuckle about the ridiculousness of segregation 
but Louis was crying… and every time we wanted Louis to loosen up, he'd sing, 
'I'm really free. Thank God Almighty, I'm really free.' It was too emotional.131 
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The Real Ambassadors is set in a fictional and newly-independent African country called 
Talgalla, and the hero's story mirrors Louis Armstrong's career and reception as a jazz 
ambassador. The hero, played by Armstrong, has just arrived with his band, bringing jazz music 
to win friends abroad for the United States. Here, Talgalla’s portrayal satirizes the political 
motives behind State Department tours in Africa:  
It had been unknown and unrecognized as a nation until the two great 
superpowers simultaneously discovered its existence. Suddenly, Talgalla was a 
nation to be reckoned with. The Russian techniques build the empty road that lay 
below them. U.S. equipment had cleared the airfield.132 
 
On the one hand, Talgalla is pictured as a product of superpower rivalries, yet it is also a place 
where a new social order can be ushered in as “a symbol of democratic and utopian 
aspiration.”133   
Returning to the narrative of the musical, Armstrong is made king for the day, and he 
promises to establish a pendulum in the town square to remind people that the world still 
swings. The meaning of the latter expression could mean literally swinging to jazz music, or 
metaphorically that the world is neither good nor evil, and each country swings like a pendulum 
between the two ends. In between musical selections, a narrator ties together the threads of 
the story, and the vocal group, like a chorus in opera or musical theater, provides commentary 
on events that do not take place on stage.  
The political and satirical tone of the musical is established by the narrator's opening 
comments, which describe the musical as neither drama nor play, but a means of “pretending” 
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to raise many voices as one.134 In the absence of scenery or costumes, except when props assist 
singers for plot advancement, the narrator opens the musical with an invitation to imagine "an 
African village with a church and a palace and people in its streets" as the backdrop to the 
musical. The opening number Ev’rybody's Comin' introduces the cast members and musicians 
by name as they enter the stage on cue. The narrator's comments lead to the next number, and 
introduce the purpose of the musical:  
[The hero] had no political message, no slogan, no plan to sell or save the world. 
Yet he, and other traveling musicians like him, had inadvertently served a national 
purpose, which officials recognized and eventually sanctioned with a program 
called Cultural Exchange.135  
 
In the song Cultural Exchange, the chorus and the hero recall a news account of Dizzy 
Gillespie putting an end to riots in Greece during his 1956 State Department tour, and 
acknowledges Gillespie’s success as the reason for continued support from the State 
Department for jazz musicians to be represented in cultural diplomacy tours.136  
 Yeah! I remember when Diz was in Greece back in ’56. 
 He did such a good job we started sending jazz all over the world… 
 No commodity is quite so strange / as this thing called Cultural Exchange.137  
  
The line “No commodity is quite so strange, as this thing called cultural exchange” can only be 
fully appreciated in the context of Brubeck and Armstrong tours. Both artists and their bands 
were “deliberately sent into the front lines of a major foreign policy crisis” as official 
representatives of the State Department.138 After a 120-day long tour of Asia and Eastern 
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Europe, the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles “unilaterally cancelled” Brubeck’s U.S. 
engagements and extended his 1958 tour to include Iran and Iraq in the midst of the Middle 
East oil crisis of 1958.139 
Iola captures the satire in Cultural Exchange with the line "Say that our prestige needs a 
tonic, export The Philharmonic," (p. 13-14) as a reminder of the U.S. State Department delaying 
to include jazz in its official cultural presentations.140 Another jab at sour race relations between 
government officials and African American musicians come out in the line, "And when all our 
neighbors called us vermin, we sent out Woody Herman," (p.14) referring to the White band 
leader and his group that toured Europe while African American groups were restricted from 
official travel.141 The song continues to highlight white musicians and/or their music that had 
long represented the State Department:  
 Gershwin gave the Muscovites a thrill (with Porgy and Bess). 
 Bernstein was the darling of Brazil. 
 And just to stop internal mayhem, we dispatched [dancer] Martha Graham. 
 
while African Americans and integrated bands did not receive official representation until 
1956.142 Cultural Exchange encapsulates the controversial and complicated history between 
jazz, African Americans, and the State Department with: 
The State Department has discovered jazz. It reaches folks like nothin' ever has. 
Like when they feel that jazzy rhythm, they know we're really with 'em. 
                                                        
139 Ibid. For more information on the Middle East Oil and Energy Crisis of July 1958, see Joe 
Stork, Middle East Oil and the Energy Crisis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), 102-108. 
140 See Chapter 2 in this thesis for information about the Music Advisory Panel’s selecting 
process for cultural diplomacy tours. 
141 See Chapter 3 in this thesis for more information on why African American jazz musicians 
were restricted from travel during the late 1950s. 
142 See Chapter 2 in this thesis for more information on representation of African American jazz 
musicians during State Department Cultural Presentations. 
  
48 
 
That's what we call cultural exchange.143 
 
The essence of cultural diplomacy is best captured in this sarcastic tag that appears towards the 
end of the song, which came about as an improvisation by Armstrong during a recording 
rehearsal with his band: “And if the world goes really wacky / We'll get John [Kennedy] to send 
out Jackie," at which point trombonist Trummy Young interrupted, "You mean Jackie 
Robinson?", to which Armstrong responded, "No, man, I mean the First Lady / That's what we 
call cultural exchange."144 The narrator’s comment closing the song draws a parallel to 
Armstrong’s delayed acceptance of an invitation to travel as part of the State Department 
cultural diplomacy tours: “He, who had experienced such great success as an unofficial 
ambassador, felt that [an official] tour could jeopardize his spotless, non-committal career.”145  
The song Remember Who You Are captures much of the sarcasm and satire in the 
musical, and recalls the briefings given to Dave Brubeck and his band at the airport shortly 
before leaving for the 1958 State Department tour: 
When you travel in a far off land,  
Remember you're more than just a band 
You represent the U.S.A.,  
So watch what you think and do and say 
Remember who you are and what you represent...  
Always be a credit to your government. 
No matter what you say or what you do,  
The eyes of the world are watching you. 
Never face a problem, always circumvent 
Stay away from issues. Be discreet,  
When controversy enters, you retreat.146 
                                                        
143 Brubeck, The Real Ambassadors, libretto, 12-13. 
144 Millstein, 1962 LP liner notes, 2. 
145 Brubeck, The Real Ambassadors, libretto, 17. The statement does not take into account 
Armstrong’s cancellation of Soviet Union jazz tour following the 1957 Little Rock Crisis. See 
Chapter 3 in this thesis for more information.  
146 Brubeck, The Real Ambassadors, libretto, 21-23. 
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While briefings were focused on preventing “potentially embarrassing behavior,” the musicians 
were given little warning on how to respond to turbulent politics and criticism of American 
domestic policy.147 The song Remember who you are also pays homage to jazz pioneers Jelly 
Roll Morton and Count Basie – “Jelly Roll and Basie helped us to invent” (p.22) - but perhaps the 
most chilling expression in the entire song is Iola’s characterization of jazz as Cold War arsenal – 
“a weapon that no other nation has, especially the Russians can't claim jazz” (p.23) – for the 
closing words of the song.148   
In King for a Day, Armstrong and Young daydream about the things they would do if 
Armstrong was appointed king for a day. When Armstrong announced that he would call a 
“basement session.” Young interjects with, "Pops, you mean a summit conference?" to which 
Armstrong replies, "Man, I don't mean a U.N. kind-of session, I mean a jam session." He goes 
onto say that he would:  
Form a swingin' band with all the leaders from every land. 
Why, they will fall right in a swingin' groove and all the “isms” gonna move. 
Relationship is bound to improve.149  
 
One of the “isms” implied here may be communism, which the United States perceived as the 
biggest threat against the world during the Cold War years. Young objects to Armstrong’s 
idealistic words with:  
How can they all agree on one melody? Won’t each man call his own tune? 
They will want the song they’ve played all along.  
You’re expecting too much too soon. 
Although my king is wise, Can't he realize / Rome wasn't built in a day 
                                                        
147 Von Eschen, “The Real Ambassadors,” in Uptown Conversation, 194.  
148 Brubeck, The Real Ambassadors, libretto, 22-23. 
149 Ibid., 33-34 
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Won't a diplomat just be apt to scat in a “hippy”-critical way?150 
 
Armstrong replies,  
Not if they are playin' jazz. They'll be no such razzmatazz. 
’Cause it's a session where we jam the blues.  
Khrushchev poundin' both his shoes couldn’t have the final say,  
If I'm king for a day.151 
 
The song clearly captures the political context in which jazz tours took place and the impact 
that cultural diplomats could make in the absence of effort from political diplomats. What is 
particularly interesting is the reference to Nikita Khrushchev, Russian prime minister during the 
height of the Cold War 1958-1964, and his shoe-banging incident during the United Nations 
General Assembly in New York City in 1960.152 King for a Day is the only musical example that 
directly references the U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War. The song also pays homage to 
“kings” or pioneers of jazz such as Buddy Bolden (who was called the King of Black New Orleans 
music), King Oliver (hot jazz pioneer), Count Basie, Duke Ellington, and Earl “Fatha” Hines.153       
The punch line of the entire musical is revealed in the title song The Real Ambassadors, 
when the chorus, pretending to be diplomatic ambassadors following instructions verbatim, 
asks the hero who the real ambassador is: 
It is evident we represent American society 
Noted for its etiquette, its manners and sobriety 
We have followed protocol with absolute propriety.154  
 
                                                        
150 Ibid., 35, 38-39. 
151 Ibid., 39.  
152 For more information on Khrushchev’s visit to the U.S. and the incident during the United 
Nations General Assembly, see William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co., 2003), 475–476, 657. 
153 Brubeck, The Real Ambassadors, libretto, 37. 
154 Ibid., 47-48. 
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The lyrics capture the sarcasm behind state officials being reluctant to include jazz musicians on 
grounds of alleged rebellious nature and improper conduct, often to do with night life and 
clubs.155 The chorus continues to describe the power and prestige carried by political diplomats 
with endorsement from public media (“NBC and CBS”), “Senators and Congressmen,” and the 
State Department itself. Fortunately, Armstrong steps in and clears up any confusion, but by 
doing so he challenges the “legitimacy of government policy” and asserts self-imposed 
authority.156  
I'm the real ambassador. 
It is evident that I wasn't sent by government to take your place 
All I do is play the blues and meet the people face to face 
I'll explain and make it plain /  
I represent the human race and don't pretend no more… 
In my humble way, I'm the U.S.A. 
Though I represent the government, 
The government don't represent some policies I'm for. 
Oh, we’ve learned to be concerned about the constitutionality  
In our nation segregation isn't a legality 
Soon our only diff’rences will be in personality 
That's what I stand for.157 
 
The lyrics here are especially personal to Armstrong’s response denouncing President 
Eisenhower and his administration over the handling of the 1957 Central High School Crisis in 
Little Rock, Arkansas. This was the only instance where Armstrong openly stated his personal 
views on racial inequality and segregation in a political context.  
 The storyline continues with a street festival held in Talgalla to welcome the musicians 
and diplomats visiting the newly-independent country. The tone of the musical takes a dark 
                                                        
155 See Chapter 2 in this thesis for information related to moral conduct and lifestyle choices of 
jazz musicians that were often scrutinized by state officials and foreign mission offices.  
156 Von Eschen, “The Real Ambassadors,” in Uptown Conversation, 197. 
157 Brubeck, The Real Ambassadors, libretto, 47-50. 
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turn as the hero reflects on his role as a goodwill ambassador and an image of reverence. The 
song They say I look like God is presented as an antiphonal Blues between Armstrong and the 
vocal trio Dave Lambert, Jon Hendricks, and Annie Ross chanting a biblical text.158 In an audio 
letter, Iola explains to Armstrong the scene in which the song occur: 
You have just been publicly shamed by the real Ambassador, who thinks that you 
have falsely claimed to be an Ambassador of the United States. The people, who 
had hailed you as a hero, sadly turn away from you because they have seen the 
real Ambassador seems to wield more power than you... You feel your idealistic 
dreams for helping the world has completely crumbled. You feel complete and 
absolute humility... From within the church you hear the chant of priests: 'God 
created Man in his image and likeness. In the image of God, created He them. 
Beloved, let us love one another for lovers of God. He that loveth God loveth his 
brother also.'159     
 
While the song The Real Ambassadors may seem to be the title song, They say I look like God 
states the real purpose of the musical exposing racial equality and humanity regardless of color 
of skin and place of birth. The song emulates a religious feeling similar to a traditional spiritual: 
Oh, Lord, please hear my plea! Oh give me eyes to see  
That our Creation was meant to be An Act of God to set man free… 
When will that great day come? When everyone is One  
And there will be no more misery When God tells man he's really free.160 
 
The story ends on an upbeat tone (pun intended!) as the people of Talgalla take to the 
streets to dance and celebrate the hero, Armstrong, being crowned King of Talgalla. Armstrong, 
in the role of the hero and “the real ambassador”, is celebrated as a symbol of hope for peace, 
                                                        
158 Ibid., 1. The biblical chant is taken from the end of the block quote: “God created Man in his 
image and likeness. In the image of God, created He them. Beloved, let us love one another for 
lovers of God. He that loveth God loveth his brother also.” 
159    Audio letter from Iola Brubeck explaining and Dave Brubeck singing "They Say I Look Like 
God" to Louis Armstrong, The Real Ambassadors, Holt-Atherton Special Collections, University 
of the Pacific Library, 0:00:53-0:03:05. 
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freedom, and human dignity in the Finale: “This day we’re free! We’re equal in ev’ry way.”161 
Iola Brubeck explains the significance of lyrics in this final coronation scene: 
The priests from the mission, standing on the church steps, sing their plea, which 
are quotations from the bible - 'Cry loud! Spare not! Lift up thy voice like a 
trumpet' [p.70] - because the priests have seen your effect on the people and they 
want you to stay there and lead them. The crowd want you to blow your horn, the 
symbol of freedom.162 
 
The finale continues with the chorus, representing the crowds, singing "Blow, Satchmo! Make 
that trumpet roar" (p.70) and "Can you hear us... talkin' to you. Good Lord, set us free" (p.74). 
The only ones who are "almost without hope," according to Iola's audio letter, are the workers 
in the street singing the spiritual: "Been waitin' so long, Lord! How long will it be?" (p.76).163 
The finale ends with Satchmo picking up his horn of freedom and everyone dancing and singing 
with the hero as the king leads them to "that promised land."164  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
161 Ibid., 66-67. 
162    Audio letter from Iola Brubeck explaining Coronation scene to Louis Armstrong, The Real  
Ambassadors, Holt-Atherton Special Collections, University of the Pacific Library, 0:00:58 – 
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CHAPTER 5  
Conclusion 
 
State Department officials expected for cultural diplomacy to be eagerly accepted 
abroad due to their nature of reaching global audiences with American values and culture. 
However, much of global reception of American ideals and cultural diplomacy propaganda 
during the Cold War were effected by U.S. domestic and foreign policy issues. Eisenhower’s 
administration built on the initiatives set in place during the Truman administration to elevate 
cultural diplomacy using Federal funding. American arts and culture, especially jazz, received 
international level acclaim as a result of investment and support from federal agencies such as 
the USIA and the State Department. This cultural “high” continued into the Kennedy 
administration with the creation of the Assistant Secretary of State for Cultural Affairs at the 
Department of State. In the 1970s, the USIA and the State Department’s Bureau of Educational 
and Cultural Affairs brought back emphasis into American studies, once again disseminating 
American culture around the world.165  While the Berlin Wall didn’t come down to the blowing 
of Satchmo’s trumpet, the immense contributions made by jazz artists via radio and diplomacy 
tours did more for the United States to win the cultural Cold War than any politician or 
government official.  
James Der Derian defined diplomacy as “a mediation between estranged individuals, 
groups, or entities. Mediation, in this context, is defined as a connecting link or an 
intervention.166 Utilizing music, especially jazz, and associated cultural exchanges (such as jam 
                                                        
165 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 489. 
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sessions) were a successful measure to build cultural relationships during the Cold War. This 
provided an opportunity for musicians to be involved in global relationship building as cultural 
ambassadors and allowed average citizens to share American values and ideals in a global 
setting. Throughout this thesis, the question I have considered here is to what extent did jazz 
succeed in being recognized as an American strength beyond Cold War cultural propaganda? 
While cultural diplomacy tours exemplified jazz as an American treasure around the world, they 
failed to create the same effect among domestic audiences at the same time and in the years to 
come.  
As Fosler-Lussier points out, while music did not have the capacity to break down 
political borders and distrust during the Cold War, jazz as an American invention transcended 
political action in helping America win the cultural Cold War.167 The argument that jazz was 
improving race relations within the United States was often crosscut with political propaganda.  
In some instances, the mere presence and representation of African Americans in the State 
Department jazz tours was enough to convey a strong positive message of racial equality. For 
the musicians who participated in the State Department tours, engagement with audiences 
created a sense of purpose in representing American culture and music, and the State 
Department’s eagerness to include jazz for cultural diplomacy helped to institutionalize jazz and 
create a fan base at home. The issue of racial equality accomplished during the cultural 
diplomacy tours is still somewhat unresolved. African America artists who openly discussed 
struggles and observations during tours used their public image as goodwill ambassadors to 
advance not only the interests of their government but also their race. A balance between 
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critical outspokenness and patriotic discretion were necessary and appropriate for advancing 
the cause of African Americans seeking racial equality and freedom during the Cold War. 
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